LONDON (AP) — Bulgarian officials announced on Monday that they will not be conducting an investigation into the suspected Russian electronic interference that occurred during a flight carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Authorities cited the prevalence of such GPS jamming incidents, which have become increasingly common since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
On Sunday, as von der Leyen's plane approached Plovdiv, Bulgaria, it experienced GPS jamming, but fortunately landed safely. This occurrence is not isolated; it is part of a disturbing trend, with nearly 80 incidents of electronic disruption attributed to Russia since the conflict erupted. In 2024 alone, there was a significant increase in interference reports mainly from Nordic and Baltic nations, including Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, drawing concerns from government officials about the disruption of communication for planes, ships, and drones.
While Russian authorities have claimed that the jamming measures are defensive in nature—aimed at shielding important cities and military installations from potential Ukrainian drone strikes—Baltic officials argue that the scale of electronic interference has escalated, leading to navigation issues far beyond Russia's borders.
In a notable incident in April 2024, a plane carrying British Defense Secretary was also affected by GPS signal jamming while nearing Russian territory. This disruption prompted the Finnish airline Finnair to temporarily halt flights to the Estonian city of Tartu after two of its planes could not land due to GPS failures.
NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte stated that the jamming experienced by von der Leyen's aircraft is part of a broader and complex strategy by Russia against Europe, which could lead to potentially disastrous consequences.
Understanding how jamming works is crucial. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which includes GPS, relies on signals from satellites located 20,000 kilometers (12,400 miles) above Earth. Typical navigation systems, whether in smartphones, cars, or aircraft, depend on precise timing from multiple satellite signals to determine location. However, these signals can be disrupted through jamming—where a powerful radio signal overshadows the GNSS signals, or through spoofing, which involves deceitfully mimicking a satellite’s signal to mislead navigational systems.
In military operations, jamming may be used to thwart incoming missile or drone threats, while spoofing can create strategic deception. Reports even suggest that Israel may have successfully used spoofing technology to launch strikes within Iranian airspace in June. Historically, Russian authorities employed spoofing systems around key locations such as the Kremlin, leading to widespread navigation issues for civilian drivers reliant on GPS.
In August, Latvia’s Electronic Communications Office identified hotspot areas of electronic interference in the Kaliningrad, Leningrad, and Pskov regions, all of which host strategic Russian military bases. These findings were corroborated by recent reports from Baltic states indicating a dramatic increase in recorded GPS interference incidents—820 in 2024, a steep rise from just 26 in 2022.
In light of these developments, Baltic nations have implemented bans on drone operations near their borders with Russia and have issued warnings to civilian drone pilots regarding signal stability. The Swedish Maritime Administration has also cautioned sailors against relying solely on GPS for navigation after receiving multiple reports of interference in the Baltic Sea.
While crews are encouraged to utilize radar and other navigation methods in turbulent conditions, anecdotal evidence suggests some may become overly reliant on GPS technology, creating a risk for maritime disasters in the event of significant disruption. As experts warn, even a minor collision involving a large cargo vessel could escalate into a major crisis, underscoring the serious implications of ongoing electronic warfare tactics employed by Russia.
