VINSKI, Estonia (AP) — Estonia is taking significant measures to bolster its defense capabilities amid rising tensions with Russia, including the extension of a border fence and the construction of anti-tank ditches and bunkers. These physical defenses, however, may not adequately prepare the country and its NATO allies for the increasing threat posed by Russian drones and electronic warfare tactics.
Countries surrounding Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, are facing heightened security concerns stemming from Moscow's ongoing conflict in Ukraine. A recent incident involving the incursion of approximately 20 Russian drones into Poland underscored the vulnerabilities in NATO's air defenses, as expensive multimillion-dollar aircraft were deployed to intercept drones that cost a fraction of that amount and ultimately crash-landed in the Polish countryside. Despite Russian claims of non-targeting, Polish officials suspect the actions were intentional.
In response to these developments, several EU defense ministers are scheduled to meet to discuss the possibility of creating what has been termed a "drone wall." NATO has issued warnings to Russia following violations of its airspace by Russian fighter jets, asserting its commitment to defend against such intrusions. However, officials acknowledge that while NATO is well-equipped to identify threats from traditional military aircraft and missiles, the challenge of countering drone warfare is considerably more complex.
According to Hanno Pevkur, Estonia's defense minister, a majority of the drones that entered Poland went undetected, highlighting a critical gap in air defense that needs urgent attention. Military officials from the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all NATO and EU members, have expressed concerns that defending against drones involves overcoming a multifaceted array of technological, financial, and bureaucratic challenges. They emphasize the need for more affordable technology that can be produced quickly and in volume, as the rapid advancement of drone technology renders current solutions potentially obsolete shortly after acquisition.
"What I need," said Lt. General Andrus Merilo, commander of Estonia's military, "is technology that is good enough, affordable, and can be produced in mass." Merilo emphasized the inadequacy of high-end capabilities that can only target individual drones, particularly in scenarios involving large-scale drone attacks.
Russia has been deploying drones nightly in Ukraine due to their low cost and effectiveness, described by Kusti Salm, a former top official at Estonia's Defense Ministry, as "a lottery ticket that always wins." This effectiveness causes strain on Ukraine's air defense systems, as intercepting drones with expensive missiles tax resources. While NATO understands conventional threats, it is apparent there is a pressing need to enhance capabilities against drone threats, according to Tomas Godliauskas, Lithuania's vice-minister of national defense.
Following the drone incursions, NATO allies deployed fighter jets and missile defense systems; however, these systems were not specifically designed for combating drones. The simplistic nature of drones, which can be constructed from materials that evade detection or mimic birds, complicates the situation. Moreover, enemy forces can exploit vulnerabilities by launching drones from within a nation’s borders, as evidenced by Ukraine's successful strikes on Russian airfields.
Technological hurdles persist, including the challenge of jamming adversary communications without disrupting one’s own. A Ukrainian drone, possibly misdirected by Russian jamming, recently landed in Estonia, as military officials acknowledged difficulties in detection. The Estonian military has similarly lost surveillance drones to Russian electronic interference, which has affected air traffic in the region.
Colonel Maris Tutins, head of Information Analysis and Operations at Latvia's Joint Forces Headquarters, stressed the urgency of addressing the drone problem in Europe. Despite growing support for a drone defense initiative along the EU's eastern border, the practical implementation remains daunting. Pevkur pointed out that establishing an effective defense system would require a coordinated, multilayered approach, rather than a simplistic electronic barrier.
With various types of drones utilized for reconnaissance, attacks, or as decoys, it is clear that the European defense landscape must evolve. Merilo underscores the necessity for a combination of sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, and low-cost missiles to effectively counter the diverse drone threat. However, current procurement processes are plagued by lengthy development timelines and high costs, primarily due to established defense companies focusing on expensive systems rather than adaptive, cost-effective solutions.
As Ukraine works swiftly to innovate its drone technologies, Europe is urged to adopt a more collaborative, responsive stance to defense needs. Godliauskas noted that rapid technology cycles in Ukraine contrast sharply with slower European procurement methods. The necessity for effective drone deterrents should not overshadow other aspects of defense preparedness, as the multifaceted threats posed by Russia include hybrid warfare and cyberattacks.
